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carbon, a standard indicator for the seriousness of climate change and desirable level of climate policy. 
The Ramsey equation for the discount rate has three components: the pure rate of time preference, a 
measure of relative risk aversion, and the rate of growth of per capita consumption. Much of the attention 
on the appropriate discount rate for long-term environmental problems has focussed on the role played by 
the pure rate of time preference in this formulation. We show that the other two elements are numerically 
just as important in considerations of anthropogenic climate change. The elasticity of the marginal utility 
with respect to consumption is particularly important because it assumes three roles: consumption 
smoothing over time, risk aversion, and inequity aversion. Given the large uncertainties about climate 
change and widely asymmetric impacts, the assumed rates of risk and inequity aversion can be expected 
to play significant roles. The consumption growth rate plays four roles. It is one of the determinants of the 
discount rate, and one of the drivers of emissions and hence climate change. We find that the impacts of 
climate change grow slower than income, so that the effective discount rate is higher than the real discount 
rate.  The differential growth rate between rich and poor countries determines the time evolution of the size 
of the equity weights. As there are a number of crucial but uncertain parameters, it is no surprise that one 
can obtain almost any estimate of the social cost of carbon.  We even show that, for a low pure rate of time 
preference, the estimate of the social cost of carbon is indeed arbitrary – as one can exclude neither large 
positive nor large negative impacts in the very long run. However, if we probabilistically constrain the 
parameters to values that are implied by observed behaviour, we find that the social cost of carbon, 
corrected for uncertainty and inequity, is 61 US dollar per metric tonne of carbon. 
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Discounting for Climate Change 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The social cost of carbon (SCC), the discounted value of damage associated with climate 
change impacts that would be avoided by a marginal reduction in carbon emissions along an arbitrary 
trajectory, is a useful measure for assessing the benefits of climate policy.  It would, of course, equal 
the Pigouvian carbon tax if it were evaluated along an optimal emission trajectory, but that is just one 
possibility.  Since SCC has been used by many to quantify, in one admittedly aggregated number, the 
significance of climate change as a public policy issue, a large number of estimates of the SCC have 
been offered in the literature.  All of these estimates depend on many assumptions about future 
emissions, climate sensitivity (warming associated with increases in greenhouse gas concentrations) 
and the seriousness of impacts over time. Since the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere is a stock problem at a century time-scale, though, it has long been known that the discount 
rate is one of the most critical factors in determining the relative magnitude of any particular estimate 
of the SCC. 
We were reminded of the importance of the discount rate in the climate change arena by many 
of the discussions that were spawned by the Stern Review (Stern, Nicholas H. et al. 2006;Stern 
2008;Stern & Taylor 2007). The Review itself reported a SCC in excess of $300/tC in the absence of 
any climate policy for its lowest damage scenarios – an estimate that landed well above the range found 
in the previous literature (Tol 2005b).  Many analysts attributed this to the very low rate of pure time 
preference adopted by the Stern author team (Arrow 2007;Jensen & Webster 2007;Mendelsohn 
2008;Nordhaus 2007;Weyant 2008).  Others argued that the Stern Review also included unusual 
assumptions about the curvature of the utility function (Dasgupta 2007;Weitzman 2007); these authors 
noted that this curvature affects the consumption discount rate as well as the aggregation between 
countries1 and alternative realizations of an uncertain future.  Still other commentators suggested that 
one should consider effective discount rates, correcting for the expected changes in the valuation of 
impacts (Sterner & Persson 2008); here, the effective discount rate is a function of the pure rate of time 
                                                 
1 Although in practice the curvature of the utility function did not affect the aggregation between regions in the Stern 
Review, because their welfare function operated of global per capita consumption figures. 
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preference, the growth rate of consumption, the rate of risk aversion, and the income elasticity of the 
value of climate change impacts. 
In this paper, we systematically explore the relative importance of these various factors. To our 
knowledge, no single study has looked at all three aspects and their various interactions.  In a previous 
paper (Anthoff et al. 2008), we only considered the pure rate of time preference and the income 
elasticity of marginal utility.  We here use a slightly updated version of the model, and add scenario 
uncertainty to the Monte Carlo analysis.  We also extended the time horizon of the analysis, which 
affects some of the results in an intriguing way. Finally, we add an investigation of effective discount 
rates in this paper. The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 sets out the conceptual and theoretical 
preliminaries.  Most of this material is standard, but we include it here for reasons of clarity and to 
suggest why it is important to look at all three aspects together; there are, in particular, no a priori 
reasons by which we can even predict the sign of changes driven by anything but time preference.  
Section 3 presents the model that we use for the numerical analyses that produced ranges of estimates 
for the social cost of carbon.  Instead of following the lead of the Stern Review and imposing our own 
normative values on the selection of values for risk aversion and time preference, we look at the 
behaviours of democratically elected governments to infer distributions of these critical factors of 
Ramsey discounting that are actually used in practice.  We use the resulting probability densities to 
constrain the estimates of the SCC and compute its expected values.  Section 4 discusses the results, 
and Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. 
2. Preliminaries 
 
Climate change is a long-term problem.  This is why the pure rate of time preference is so 
important.  Greenhouse gas emission reduction over the near-term would mitigate future damages, but 
they would do little to alter the present climate and/or the present rate of change in climate impacts.  
The costs of emission abatement must therefore be justified by the benefits of avoided impacts in the 
future.  People discount future consumption for two reasons (Ramsey 1928).  Firstly, they expect to 
become richer in the future, and so they care less about an additional dollar then than they do about an 
additional dollar today.  Secondly, they are impatient.  This leads to the Ramsey rule: 
r gρ η= +  (1) 
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where r is the discount rate, ρ is the rate of pure time preference, g is the growth rate of per capita  
consumption, and η is the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption.  It is clear that both ρ and η are 
important in specifying an optimal consumption discount rate. 
Climate change is not just a long-term problem.  It is a problem that is confounded by 
significant sources of uncertainty;  and it is a problem where the impacts differentially affect people 
with widely different incomes.  The rate of pure time preference ρ speaks only to the first characteristic 
of the climate policy problem – the time scale issue.  The elasticity of marginal utility with respect to 
consumption, the parameter η, speaks to all three characteristics.  First of all, it indicates the degree to 
which an additional dollar brings less joy as income increases.  Moreover, the parameter η can also be 
interpreted as a measure of how one evaluates a gain of a dollar for rich person relative to a gain of a 
dollar for a poor person.  This is why η is occasionally referred to as the parameter of inequity aversion.  
In its simplest form (Azar & Sterner 1996;Fankhauser et al. 1997), equity-weighted impacts are based 
on the following equation 
(2) ww c
c c
yD D
y
η⎛ ⎞
= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  
where Dw is the globally aggregate impact, Dc is the monetary impact of climate change in country c, 
yw is globally average per capita income, and yc is per capita income in country c.  If η = 0, the global 
impact is the unweighted sum of national impacts but if η > 0, the impact of climate change on poor 
countries (relative to the world average) receive a greater weight than impacts on rich countries. 
Furthermore, the elasticity of marginal utility can be viewed as a reflection of relative risk aversion.  In 
this role, η explains why risk-averse people buy insurance; they are willing to pay a premium that is 
proportional in first order approximation to the parameter η to eliminate variability in outcomes 
because doing so increases their expected utility. 
(Hasselmann et al. 1997) added some significant texture to the application of Ramsey 
discounting to the climate issue by introducing effective discount rates; their contribution is discussed 
thoroughly by (Horowitz 2002;Tol 2003;Yang 2003) and recently raised again by (Hoel & Sterner 
2007;Koegel 2009;Sterner & Persson 2008).  In this formulation, the net present value D of a series of 
future damages Dt caused by climate change is given by 
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where y is per capita income, P is population (conveniently held constant), and ε is the income 
elasticity of impacts; d is relative impact, and D is the actual absolute impact and D’ is the absolute 
impact with constant vulnerability; as above, r is the discount rate, ρ is the rate of pure time preference, 
g is the growth rate of per capita consumption, and η is the elasticity of marginal utility of 
consumption.  It is clear that the effective discount rate r’=ρ+(η-ε)g is smaller than the ordinary 
discount rate r for any ε>0.  Equation (2) also shows that the net present value of a series of escalating 
impacts equals the net present value of a series of constant impacts evaluated at a lower discount rate.2  
Couched in these terms, it is apparent that the rate of escalation of impacts is as important as the rate of 
pure time preference and the rate of risk aversion. Indeed, in Equation (2), if the income elasticity is 
greater than the rate of risk aversion, the effective discount rate may be negative – in which case the net 
present value can be unbounded. 
In sum, then, we expected that the SCC would react as follows to changes in three critical 
parameters that influence the appropriate discount rate.  The higher the pure rate of time preference, ρ, 
the less one cares about the future. Damages from climate change, as they occur over time, are 
therefore less of problem and the SCC should fall.  Similarly, the higher risk aversion, η, the higher the 
discount rate in a scenario of growing per capita income and so the SCC should again fall.  However, 
higher aversion to risk means that one is more concerned about uncertainty and particularly concerned 
about negative surprises; as a result, the SCC should rise with higher values of η.  Furthermore, the 
higher aversion to risk also corresponds to greater concern about income distribution; if one assumes 
that climate change disproportionally affects the poor, then the SCC should again rise.  The role of 
income elasticities in determining effective discount rates is even more complicated since the direction 
of influence depends on the relative size of η.  So while we can predict, on first principles, that the 
effect of changes in time preference ρ, the effects of risk aversion η and income elasticities are 
ambiguous. 
 
2 Tol (2003) argues that effective discount rates (sensu Horowitz) and dual-discount rates (sensu Hasselmann) 
inappropriately use the discount rate to correct for an incompletely specified impact function. 
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3. The model 
 
Armed with these insights, we use the integrated assessment model FUND to test the 
hypothesis that η and/or income elasticities could actually turn out to be more important in determining 
the SCC than ρ.  In many ways, FUND is a standard integrated assessment model (Guo et al. 2006;Tol 
1997;Tol 1999;Tol 2006).  It has simple representations of the demography, economy, energy, 
emissions, and emission reduction policies for 16 regions.  It has simple representations of the cycles of 
greenhouse gases, radiative forcing, climate, and sea level rise.  In other ways, though, FUND is 
unique.  It is alone in the detail of its representation of the impacts of climate change.  Impacts on 
agriculture, forestry, water use, energy use, the coastal zone, hurricanes, ecosystems, and health are all 
modelled separately – both in “physical” units and their monetary value (Tol 2002a;Tol 2002b).  
Moreover, FUND allows vulnerability to climate change impacts to be an explicit function of the level 
and rate of regional development (Tol 2005a;Tol et al. 2007). 
This paper uses version 3.4 of the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and 
Distribution (FUND). Version 3.4 of FUND corresponds to version 1.6 (Tol et al. 1999;Tol 2001;Tol 
2002c) except for the impact module described in (Link & Tol 2004;Tol 2002a;Tol 2002b). A full list 
of papers, the source code, and the technical documentation for the model can be found on line at 
http://www.fund-model.org/.  The model distinguishes 16 major regions of the world, viz. the United 
States of America, Canada, Western Europe, Japan and South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, 
Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, Central America, South 
America, South Asia, Southeast Asia, China, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Small Island 
States.  The model runs from 1950 to 3000 in time steps of one year.  The prime reason for starting in 
1950 is to initialize the climate change impact module.  In FUND, the impacts of climate change are 
assumed to depend on the impact of the previous year, this way reflecting the process of adjustment to 
climate change.  Because the initial values to be used for the year 1950 cannot be approximated very 
well, both physical and monetized impacts of climate change tend to be misrepresented in the first few 
decades of the model runs.3 The centuries after the 21st are included to assess the long-term 
implications of climate change. Previous versions of the model stopped at 2300. 
                                                 
3  The period of 1950-2000 is used for the calibration of the model, which is based on the IMAGE 100-year database (Batjes 
& Goldewijk 1994). The scenario for the period 2010-2100 is based on the EMF14 Standardized Scenario, which lies 
somewhere in between IS92a and IS92f (Leggett et al. 1992). The 2000-2010 period is interpolated from the immediate past 
(http://earthtrends.wri.org), and the period 2100-3000 extrapolated. 
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The scenarios are defined by the rates of population growth, economic growth, autonomous 
energy efficiency improvements as well as the rate of decarbonization of the energy use (autonomous 
carbon efficiency improvements), and emissions of carbon dioxide from land use change, methane and 
nitrous oxide.  The scenarios of economic and population growth are perturbed by the impact of 
climatic change. Population decreases with increasing climate change related deaths that result from 
changes in heat stress, cold stress, malaria, and storms. Heat and cold stress are assumed to have an 
effect only on the elderly, non-reproductive population. In contrast, the other sources of mortality also 
affect the number of births. Heat stress only affects the urban population. The share of the urban 
population among the total population is based on the World Resources Databases 
(http://earthtrends.wri.org). It is extrapolated based on the statistical relationship between urbanization 
and per-capita income, which are estimated from a cross-section of countries in 1995. Climate-induced 
migration between the regions of the world also causes the population sizes to change. Immigrants are 
assumed to assimilate immediately and completely with the respective host population. 
The endogenous parts of FUND consist of the atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, 
methane, nitrous oxide and sulphur hexafluoride, the global mean temperature, the impact of carbon 
dioxide emission reductions on the economy and on emissions, and the impact of the damages to the 
economy and the population caused by climate change. Methane and nitrous oxide are taken up in the 
atmosphere, and then geometrically depleted. The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide, 
measured in parts per million by volume, is represented by the five-box model (Hammitt et al. 
1992;Maier-Reimer & Hasselmann 1987). The model also contains sulphur emissions (Tol 2006). 
The radiative forcing of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, sulphur hexafluoride and 
sulphur aerosols is as in the IPCC (Ramaswamy et al. 2001). The global mean temperature T is 
governed by a geometric build-up to its equilibrium (determined by the radiative forcing RF), with a 
half-life of 50 years. In the base case, the global mean temperature rises in equilibrium by 2.5°C for a 
doubling of carbon dioxide equivalents. Regional temperature follows from multiplying the global 
mean temperature by a fixed factor, which corresponds to the spatial climate change pattern averaged 
over 14 GCMs (Mendelsohn et al. 2000). The global mean sea level is also geometric, with its 
equilibrium level determined by the temperature and a half-life of 50 years. Both temperature and sea 
level are calibrated to correspond to the best guess temperature and sea level for the IS92a scenario 
(Kattenberg et al. 1996). 
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The climate impact module (Tol 2002a;Tol 2002b) includes the following categories: 
agriculture, forestry, sea level rise, cardiovascular and respiratory disorders related to cold and heat 
stress, malaria, dengue fever, schistosomiasis, diarrhoea, energy consumption, water resources, 
unmanaged ecosystems, and tropical and extra tropical storms. The last two are new additions(Narita et 
al. 2008;Narita et al. 2009). Climate change related damages can be attributed to either the rate of 
change (benchmarked at 0.04°C/yr) or the level of change (benchmarked at 1.0°C). Damages from the 
rate of temperature change slowly fade, reflecting adaptation(Tol 2002b). 
People can die prematurely due to climate change, or they can migrate because of sea level rise. 
Like all impacts of climate change, these effects are monetized. The value of a statistical life is set to be 
200 times the annual per capita income. The resulting value of a statistical life lies in the middle of the 
observed range of values in the literature (Cline 1992). The value of emigration is set to be 3 times the 
per capita income (Tol 1995), the value of immigration is 40 per cent of the per capita income in the 
host region (Cline 1992). Losses of dryland and wetlands due to sea level rise are modeled explicitly. 
The monetary value of a loss of one square kilometre of dryland was on average $4 million in OECD 
countries in 1990 (Fankhauser 1994). Dryland value is assumed to be proportional to GDP per square 
kilometre. Wetland losses are valued at $2 million per square kilometre on average in the OECD in 
1990 (Fankhauser 1994). The wetland value is assumed to have logistic relation to per capita income. 
Coastal protection is based on cost-benefit analysis, including the value of additional wetland lost due 
to the construction of dikes and subsequent coastal squeeze. 
Other impact categories, such as agriculture, forestry, energy, water, storm damage, and 
ecosystems, are directly expressed in monetary values without an intermediate layer of impacts 
measured in their ‘natural’ units (Tol 2002a). Impacts of climate change on energy consumption, 
agriculture, and cardiovascular and respiratory diseases explicitly recognize that there is a climatic 
optimum, which is determined by a variety of factors, including plant physiology and the behaviour of 
farmers. Impacts are positive or negative depending on whether the actual climate conditions are 
moving closer to or away from that optimum climate. Impacts are larger if the initial climate conditions 
are further away from the optimum climate. The optimum climate is of importance with regard to the 
potential impacts. The actual impacts lag behind the potential impacts, depending on the speed of 
adaptation. The impacts of not being fully adapted to new climate conditions are always negative (Tol 
2002b). 
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The impacts of climate change on coastal zones, forestry, tropical and extratropical storm 
damage, unmanaged ecosystems, water resources, diarrhoea malaria, dengue fever, and schistosomiasis 
are modelled as simple power functions. Impacts are either negative or positive, and they do not change 
sign (Tol 2002b).  
Vulnerability to climate change changes with population growth, economic growth, and 
technological progress. Some systems are expected to become more vulnerable, such as water 
resources (with population growth), heat-related disorders (with urbanization), and ecosystems and 
health (with higher per capita incomes). Other systems are projected to become less vulnerable, such as 
energy consumption (with technological progress), agriculture (with economic growth) and vector- and 
water-borne diseases (with improved health care) (Tol 2002b). The income elasticities (Tol 2002b) are 
estimated from cross-sectional data or taken from the literature. 
We estimated the SCC cost of carbon by computing the total, monetised impact of climate 
change along a business as usual path and along a path with slightly higher emissions between 2005 
and 2014.4  Differences in impacts were calculated, discounted back to the current year, and 
normalised by the difference in emissions.5  The SCC is thereby expressed in dollars per tonne of 
carbon at a point in time – the standard measure of how much future damage would be avoided if 
today’s emissions were reduced by one tonne.6  That is, 
(S3) 
1 1
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where 
• SCCr is the regional social cost of carbon (in US dollar per tonne of carbon); 
• r denotes region; 
• t and s denote time (in years); 
• I are monetised impacts (in US dollar per year); 
• E are emissions (in metric tonnes of carbon); 
                                                 
4 The social cost of carbon of emissions in future or past periods is beyond the scope of this paper. 
5 We abstained from levelizing the incremental impacts within the period 2005-14 because the numerical effect of this 
correction is minimal while it is hard to explain. 
6 Full documentation of the FUND model, including the assumptions in the Monte Carlo analysis, is available at 
http://www.fund-model.org. 
 9
• δ are additional emissions (in metric tonnes of carbon); 
• ρ is the pure rate of time preference (in fraction per year); 
• η is the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption; and 
• g is the growth rate of per capita consumption (in fraction per year). 
We first compute the SCC per region, and then aggregate, as follows 
(S4) 
16 Y
ε⎛ ⎞2005,
1 2005,
world
r
r r
SCC SCC
Y
=
= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  
where 
• SCC is the global social cost of carbon (in US dollar per tonne of carbon); 
• SCCr is the regional social cost of carbon (in US dollar per tonne of carbon); 
• r denotes region; 
• Yworld is the global average per capita consumption (in US dollar per person per year); 
• Yr is the regional average per capita consumption (in US dollar per person per year); and 
• ε is the rate of inequity aversion; ε=0 in the case without equity weighing; ε=η in the case with 
equity weighing. 
In the case of uncertainty, we compute the expected value of the SCC, as follows: 
(S5) 
1
1E( ) ( )
MC
i
i
SCC SCC
MC
θ
=
= ∑  
where 
• E(SCC) is the expected value of the social cost of carbon (in US dollar per tonne of carbon); 
• i indexes the Monte Carlo run; 
• MC is the number of Monte Carlo runs; MC = 1000; and 
• θ is the vector of uncertain input parameters, fully specified on http://www.fundmodel.org/ 
 
4. Results 
 
We estimated the social cost of carbon (SCC) for a large number of cases.  Here we show only 
a selection of results.  First, we show the SCC as a function of the pure rate of time preference (ρ) and 
the income elasticity of marginal utility (η).  Second, we show the SCC as a function of the time 
horizon for selected ρ and η.  Third, we investigate the effect of the income elasticity of the impact of 
climate change as aggregated in the SCC, and estimate the aggregate income elasticity.  We then 
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analyse scenario sensitivity before discussing a probability-weighted combination of all of the above to 
arrive at some summary estimates. 
All results are expressed in US dollars at 1995 price levels. 
4.1. Time preference and risk aversion 
We estimated the SCC for a range of values for ρ and η, but we report our results in stages to 
highlight the triple role of η.  We first considered results for cases in which η affects only the discount 
rate.  That is, we pretended that uncertainty about climate change had been resolved and that income 
differences between countries were irrelevant.  The second set of results put uncertainty back into the 
problem; the reported expected values of the SCC are the product of a Monte Carlo analysis of all the 
uncertain parameters in the FUND model.  A third batch of results were drawn from the original world 
of perfect climate certainty, but social cost estimates applied equity weighting to the regional impacts 
of climate change.  Finally, we report expected social cost estimates for cases in which both uncertainty 
and equity-weighing played a role – the cases where η plays its theoretically appropriate triple role.7 
Figure 1 shows the SCC cost of carbon for the four cases, varying η for a given ρ (bivariate 
plots are not particularly insightful).  If we ignore concerns about equity and uncertainty (Panel A), the 
SCC roughly decreases as expected with the discount rate.  For ρ = η = 0, SCC = $34,937.5/tC (the 
highest SCC); it falls to SCC = $10.3/tC for ρ = η = 1 and to SCC = -$4.6/tC for ρ = η = 2.  The sign 
turns negative because climate change is initially beneficial to the world economy.  For ρ = η = 3, 
however, SCC climbs back to -$3.7/tC because the discount rate is so high that it even discounts initial 
benefits significantly.  Indeed, the graphs show that while the SCC tends to increase with higher ρ and 
η, this pattern first flattens and then reverses for high discount rates. 
The profiles change when uncertainty is taken into account (cf. Panel B).  By and large, the 
SCC increases with both ρ and η; and the mean SCC tends to be greater than the best guess SCC. For ρ 
= η = 1, E(SCC) = $43.9/tC, more than four times higher than the best guess; for ρ = η = 2, -$1.9/tC is 
less than half the best guess.8  However, the pattern reverses when η approaches 3, and this trend is 
                                                 
7 Note that we assume that the scenarios of population, economy, energy and emissions are independent of ρ and η. 
Implicitly, we thus assume that changes in ρ and η are exactly offset by changes in the scenario of technological change. 
8 For reference, Lord Stern of Brentford chose ρ = 0.1%, η = 1 and estimates E(SCC) = $314/tC. Here, E(SCC) = $673/tC 
while Anthoff et al. (2008) have E(SCC) = $333/tC.  The Stern Review used the PAGE(Hope 2008) model – which 
truncates the tails of distributions of input parameters that FUND fully recognizes, but keeps vulnerability to climate change 
as in 1995 while FUND has vulnerability declining with development – the two main differences between the two models 
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particularly pronounced for low values of ρ.   For higher rates of risk aversion, the mean SCC is 
increasingly dominated by a few Monte Carlo runs with either large positive or large negative impacts 
even though the Monte Carlo sample starts to diverge only in the medium run.  When ρ < 0.5, our 
estimates of E(SCC) become unreliable.  There is no clear relationship with either ρ or η, although the 
numbers tend to be large, either negative or positive.  The reason is that the uncertainty about the far 
future is very large indeed, and that this uncertainty is not discounted.  In the Monte Carlo sample, 
there are runs with large and rich populations with positive impacts that are small relative to the 
economy but large relative to the rest of the Monte Carlo sample.  There are also runs with large 
negative impacts nearly everywhere.  Depending on the parameter choice, either of the two extremes 
can dominate the mean.  The result cannot be interpreted, and the estimates are unreliable in the sense 
that they vary strongly with small parameter changes. 
The results are different again with equity weighing and no uncertainty (cf. Panel C).  For ρ = η 
= 0, SCC = $43,937.5/tC; since η = 0 implies equal weights, this is the global maximum.  A local 
maximum appears at SCC = $108.7/tC when ρ = 0 and η = 3.  A global minimum is observed when ρ 
= η = 3 and SCC = -$55.2/tC.  This minimum emerges because CO2 fertilization brings short-term 
benefits even to poor countries that will be hurt by climate change in the longer term.  For these 
parameters, long-term losses are heavily discounted and short-term benefits in developing countries are 
emphasized.  See (Anthoff, Tol, & Yohe 2008) for more discussion on CO2 fertilization. 
The results change once more when equity weighting is added to the uncertainty (cf. Panel D).  
Panel B shows peculiar behaviour for high values of η.  This disappears in Panel D, indicating that the 
numerical instabilities in the Monte Carlo analysis are due to high positive or negative impacts in rich 
countries which are discounted here by equity weighting.  With equity weighting, the results are also 
more stable for low values of ρ – although for very low values of both ρ and η the SCC cannot be 
estimated reliably.  Note that the E(SCC) is strictly positive for this, the theoretically correct scenario. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
roughly offset one another if the evaluated with a similar time horizon. With such a low discount rate, the longer time 
horizon used here is more appropriate, and the bias introduced by a “short” time horizon is indeed considerable. 
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4.2. Time horizon 
Figure 2 shows the social cost of carbon as a function of the time horizon.  In the bottom left 
panel, both the pure rate of time preference and the rate of risk aversion are set to unity.  The estimate 
of the social cost of carbon converges in a few centuries.  For ρ = 3% (bottom right panel), 
convergence is faster for obvious reasons, but note that the SCC is still converging after 100 years.  
Convergence is faster without equity weights and without uncertainty. 
The top left panel of Figure 2 shows the results for ρ = 0%.  Without uncertainty, the pattern is 
smooth but the SCC continues to increase throughout the time horizon.  Even though the scenario 
assumes that greenhouse gas emissions fall to zero and climate change comes to an eventual halt, 
temperatures do not return to pre-industrial levels.  Indeed, some 13% of the incremental carbon 
dioxide used to compute the marginal damage costs stays in the atmosphere forever and impacts 
remain.9  For ρ = 0%, one therefore needs an infinite horizon and the SCC would be infinite (either 
positive or negative). 
With uncertainty, the pattern is different but not unexpected given the discussion of Figure 1.  
With uncertainty but without equity weighting, E(SCC) first increases as the time horizon is further 
away, but then it starts to fall.  This is because in a handful of scenarios, positive impacts on rich 
economies dominate the mean.  Equity weighting discounts such positive impacts, and E(SCC) 
continues to rise.  In both cases, E(SCC) becomes more erratic as the time horizon expands.  This is 
because the uncertainty about the remote future is so large that extremely high and low impacts 
increasingly drive the mean estimate.  This is more pronounced for higher values of the rate of risk 
aversion (results not shown).  The top right panel of Figure 2 shows the same pattern, albeit subdued, 
for a pure rate of time preference of 0.1%. 
4.3. Income elasticities 
In the third set of experiments, we set all the impact elasticities in the impact module of FUND 
equal to zero.  That is, we kept the pattern of vulnerability to climate change constant at the level of the 
calibration year (1995).  Figure 3 shows the results without equity weighting and without uncertainty.  
One of the basic results of the climate change impact literature is that poor countries tend to be more 
                                                 
9 Note that we implicitly assume that carbon dioxide emissions will go to zero before all coal reserves are exhausted. 
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vulnerable to climate change, and the results in Figure 3 certainly reflect this.  With zero income 
elasticities, the SCC tend to be higher – at least, if the discount rate is low.  If the discount rate is high, 
the SCC is negative (that is, climate change is a net benefit); and with zero income elasticities, the SCC 
is even more negative (that is, climate change is an even greater benefit).  The reason can be found in 
the positive impacts of carbon dioxide fertilization on agriculture in poor countries.  With the original 
income elasticity of -0.31, these benefits grow smaller as agriculture become less important; but with a 
zero income elasticity, these benefits remain. 
Next, we compute the overall income elasticity of impacts in Equation (2).  This required that 
we find a value for  ε that would set  the SCC with original income elasticities equal to  the SCC with 
zero income elasticities for a given ρ; i.e., we needed to compute ε such that  
(4) ' | ( , , ) ( , ',0)SCC SCCε η η ρ η ξ ρ η= − =  
where ξ is the vector of income elasticities of impacts by sector. Note that we restrict 0 ≤ η ≤ 3 so that 
we interpolate but we do not extrapolate.  Figure 4 shows the results of this calculation.  They vary 
with the rate of risk aversion and with the rate of pure time preference.  Unlike Equation (2), FUND 
does not assume a constant growth rate in all regions and all periods.  Furthermore, FUND has 
different income elasticities for different impacts.  The qualitative pattern is as one would expect from 
Figure 3.  Since poor countries are more vulnerable to climate change than rich countries, their income 
elasticities are negative.  The lowest value in Figure 4 is ε = -0.38.  The income elasticity increases 
with a higher discount rate, and it becomes positive for a small fraction of parameter combinations.  
The highest value is ε = 2.55. 
4.4. Scenario uncertainty 
In the Monte Carlo analysis, the growth rates of population, economic activity, energy use, and 
emissions are uncertain, but they are centered on a single scenario.  One may, however, argue that the 
uncertainty about the future is multimodal since, for instance, there may be causal link from low 
population growth to steady economic development.  Or because economies of scale may allow the 
energy system to settle into either a high emission equilibrium (based on coal) or a low emission 
equilibrium (based on renewables).  To explore what changing the baselines might mean to our results, 
we therefore repeated the analysis centred on the four SRES scenarios.  The analysis is unimodal for 
each of the scenarios, but multimodal when put together. 
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Figure 5 shows the estimated SCC for each of the five scenarios as a function of the rate of risk 
aversion and a pure rate of time preference of one per cent per year.  The left panel depicts the case 
without uncertainty and without equity weighting.  The pattern is the same for all five scenarios.  The 
right panel shows the case with uncertainty and equity weighting.  The A1 and B2 do not show the high 
E(SCC) for high values of η.  This is because these scenarios have a more egalitarian distribution of 
income, so that the effect equity weighting is less pronounced, and a slower rate of warming, so the 
uncertainty about impacts grows not as fast as in other scenarios.  The results of the A2 scenario 
deviate from the other scenarios for a low value of η.  The A2 scenario has the largest income gaps of 
all scenarios; as equity weights are unity for η = 0, the large positive impacts on rich countries in a few 
Monte Carlo runs dominate the results. 
4.5. Probability weighted results 
Finally, w used two different sources to inform our representations of combinations ρ and η that 
reflect actual practice across decision-makers.  Firstly, (Evans & Sezer 2004;Evans & Sezer 2005) 
estimate η = 1.49, with a standard deviation of 0.19 for 22 rich and democratic countries from income 
redistribution data, using the method of (Stern 1977).  They also independently estimate ρ = 1.08 ± 
0.20 %/year using data on mortality rates.  Assuming normality, these results support a bivariate 
probability density function on ρ and η.  Secondly, we used data on nominal per capita consumption 
growth rates, inflation rates, and nominal interest rates for 27 OECD countries from 1970 to 2006 to 
produce a joint distribution for η and ρ from observed behaviour.  More specifically, we interpreted 
observations of the real interest rate (r in equation (1) and the difference between the nominal rate and 
the rate of inflation) and the growth rate g as drawings from a bivariate normal distribution.  The 
Ramsey equation implies that realizations for r and g together support a linear combination for ρ and η.  
As a result, the bivariate distribution for r and g implies a degenerate bivariate distribution for ρ and η.  
The mean for η is 1.18, with a standard deviation of 0.80, but the distribution is right skewed with a 
mode of η = 0.55.  The mean of ρ is 1.4%, with a standard deviation of 0.9%; the distribution is again 
right-skewed, this time with a mode of ρ = 0.9%.  The characteristics of this distribution are not 
inconsistent with the underlying distributions reported by Evans and Sezer, but it does clearly differ in 
shape.  The sources are independent, so we multiplied the two probability density functions and 
rescaled to arrive at the bivariate probability density function shown in Figure 5.  Here, η = 1.47 ± 0.19 
and ρ = 1.07 ± 0.20. 
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We used the bivariate probability density function to compute the expected SCC, treating ρ and 
η as uncertain input variables.  We used the results of all five scenarios described above giving each a 
probability of 0.2.  Table 1 shows the results.  Without uncertainty and without equity weighting, the 
SCC is negative.  In this case, the Pigou tax would actually be a subsidy.  However, given that the 
standard deviation is larger than the mean, one should not place too much weight on this finding.  The 
expected SCC increases if either uncertainty or equity weighing is added.  Uncertainty clearly is the 
more important factor; in either case, the standard deviation is large compared to the mean.  If both 
uncertainty and equity weighting are included, E(SCC) = $44/tC, with a standard deviation of $12/tC; 
note that the standard deviation is still relatively large compared to the mean. 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
 
We used FUND, an integrated assessment model, to explore systematically the social cost of 
carbon and how it varies with the pure rate of time preference, the income elasticity of marginal utility 
(in its triple role of consumption growth discount rate, risk aversion, and inequity aversion), the time 
horizon used in the analysis, the income elasticity of climate change impacts, and emission scenarios.  
On the one hand, the results are sobering.  Depending on the assumptions, one can get high or low 
estimates of the social cost of carbon – and one can even get large negative values.  That is, one can 
choose a set of parameters, based on “ethical” or other considerations, to defend any position on 
climate policy.  This is no surprise.  Climate change is a long term problem, surrounded by large 
uncertainties with strong distributional consequences.  Climate change is thus a moral problem, and 
different people would reasonably take a different position on the urgency of climate policy.  On the 
other hand, extreme values of the social cost of carbon are associated with positions that are at odds 
with revealed preferences on time preference and risk aversion.  For middle of the road choices of the 
most sensitive parameters, the range of social cost of carbon estimates is much more limited. 
Besides these broad insights, a number of specific results emerge as well.  First, with a very low 
discount rate, the social cost of carbon is arbitrary.  We know this because the estimate does not 
converge as the time horizon expands.  It follows that assumptions about the remote future dominate 
the results; and since these assumptions are so uncertain, they are essentially arbitrary. 
Second, the income elasticity of the aggregate impact of climate change is probably negative.  
As a result,  the effective discount rate applied to  impacts is greater than the real discount rate. 
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Third, the expected social cost of carbon is estimated to be $44/tC in 1995 dollars, which equals 
$61/tC in 2008 prices (using US CPI data).  The price of carbon dioxide emission permits in the 
European Union was $78/tC in January 2009.10  The United States has only one federal law that puts a 
price on carbon.  It was buried in the first stimulus package passed at the end of 2008 (Division B of 
H.R. 1424: The Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008) – offering a credit of $20 for every 
short ton of CO2 ($80/tC) sequestered in a geologically secure locations with the United States.  The 
bill also offers half that value for using CO2 to enhance the productivity of domestic oil and gas wells.  
Meanwhile, the first two auctions of carbon permits in the Northeast States program that covers major 
electricity providers cleared at around $3.75 per short ton of CO2 ($15/tC).  So while federal policy has 
yet to be directed at reducing carbon emissions (as of January 19, 2008), the official price of carbon is 
not zero.  Perhaps as a result, many utilities apparently factor in a carbon tax of $15/tC in their 
investment decisions (Richels, personal communication).  Was the price of carbon too high in the 
European Union as the Obama administration came to power, or was it too low in the United States?  
That remains to be seen.  What is clear is that developing countries do not have climate policies; of 
course these countries are most vulnerable to climate change, but they have done the least to cause the 
problem. 
The above results come with all the usual caveats.  Our knowledge of climate change impacts is 
incomplete, and may be biased downwards.  The analysis presented here is based on a single model.  
This calls for further research, and replication of the current paper by other researchers.  The income 
elasticity of marginal utility plays a triple role in our analysis.  Consumption over time, risk aversion, 
and inequity aversion are conceptually different, but numerically the same in our set-up. One may 
argue that inequity aversion is different within and between countries.  This calls for a richer 
specification of utility and welfare functions, but we have yet managed to find a workable alternative.  
Future research should also have a closer look at the probability density function of the social cost of 
carbon, and particularly at the behaviour of its tails. 
Researchers will work for some time to come to improve our understanding of the social cost of 
carbon and explore its appropriate use both in framing climate policy and supporting evaluations of 
other policies whose benefits of costs might include changes in carbon emissions.  It is important to 
                                                 
10 Anthoff et al. (2009) argue that one should equity weight not only SCC estimates but also any other cost estimate before 
comparing them. When we apply the same equity weights to the European Union carbon permit price of $78/tC that we 
applied to our SCC estimates, we get an equity weighted European Union carbon permit price of $8/tC, which would 
suggest that European carbon permit prices are too low compared to our SCC estimate. 
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emphasize, however, that the evidence presented here and elsewhere in these efforts suggests that, to 
the best of our current knowledge, climate change is a real problem and that policy makers around the 
world should act quickly to put a positive price on greenhouse gas emissions that will grow over time. 
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Figure 1.  The marginal damage cost of carbon emissions as a function of the rate of risk aversion  
for selected rates of time preference. 
 
Panel A (top left) shows the sensitivity of SCC estimates without equity weighting and without 
uncertainty.  Panel B (top right) shows the sensitivity of SCC estimates to uncertainty without equity 
weighting.  Panel C ( bottom left) shows the sensitivity of SCC estimates to equity weighting without 
uncertainty.  Panel D (bottom right) shows the sensitivity of SCC estimates to equity weighting with 
uncertainty fully represented.  Results for a pure rate of time preference of 3%, 2%, and 1% per year 
are displayed on the left axis; for a pure rate of time preference of 0.5% and 0%, the results are on the 
right axis. 
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Figure 2.  The marginal damage cost of carbon emissions as a function of the time horizon with 
and without uncertainty and with and without equity weighting. 
 
Panel A (top left) shows the social cost of carbon for a pure rate of time preference of zero.  Panel B 
(top right) shows the social cost of carbon for a pure rate of time preference of one tenth of a per cent 
per year.  Panel C (bottom left) shows the social cost of carbon for a pure rate of time preference of one 
per cent per year.  Panel D (bottom right) shows the social cost of carbon for a pure rate of time 
preference of three per cent per year.  In all panels, the rate of risk aversion is one. 
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Figure 3.  The marginal damage cost of carbon emissions as a function of the rate of risk aversion 
for selected rates of time preference and alternative income elasticities. 
 
Panel A (left) shows the sensitivity of SCC estimates with the income elasticities of climate change 
impacts as specified at http://www.fund-model.org/.  Panel A is equal to Panel A of Figure 1, but 
drawn at a different scale.  Panel B (right) shows the sensitivity of SCC estimates with the income 
elasticities of climate change impacts set to zero.  Both panels are without equity weighting and 
without uncertainty. 
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Figure 4.  The implied income elasticity of total impacts as a function of the rate of risk aversion  
and the pure rate of time preference. 
 
Note that zero values are shown where the income elasticity could not be interpolated. 
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Figure 5.  The marginal damage cost of carbon emissions as a function of the rate of risk aversion  
for selected rates of time preference and alternative scenarios. 
 
Panel A (left) shows the sensitivity of SCC estimates without uncertainty and without equity 
weighting.  Panel B (right) shows the sensitivity of SCC estimates with uncertainty and with equity 
weighting. 
 23
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0.
1.0
2.0
3.0
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.010
0.012
0.014
0.016
0.018
0.020
probability
risk aversion
time preference
0.018-0.02
0.016-0.018
0.014-0.016
0.012-0.014
0.01-0.012
0.008-0.01
0.006-0.008
0.004-0.006
0.002-0.004
0-0.002
 
Figure 6.  Probability density function of risk aversion and time preference  
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Table 1. Estimates of the expected social cost of carbon ($/tC) and its standard deviation ($/tC). 
 
 
  Equity weighting included
  No Yes 
Uncertainty included No -1.88 8.96
  (2.20) (6.88)
 Yes -0.35 44.35
  (4.85) (11.85)
 
Note that the standard deviation includes the uncertainty about ρ and η only. 
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